UNDERSTANDING THE INTRICATE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS AND WHY ALL CRIMINAL APPEALS CANNOT BE ACADEMIC OR LIFELESS IN SITUATIONS WHERE APPELLANT HAS FINISHED SERVING HIS TERM OF IMPRISONMENT: ANALYSIS OF THE CASE OF EMMA AMANCHUKWU V. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA VIS-À-VIS THE REASONING OF HIS LORDSHIP HON. JUSTICE O.A. ADEGBEHINGBE, JCA IN THE CASE OF EMMANUEL ODAFE IGBINI V. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

Abstract

This paper critically examines the doctrine of stare decisis and its nuanced application to criminal appeals, particularly in cases where the appellant has completed a term of imprisonment before the appeal is determined. It interrogates the often-misconceived interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Emma Amanchukwu v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, which has been repeatedly invoked to dismiss criminal appeals as academic or lifeless once a convict has served the sentence. Through a doctrinal and comparative analysis, the paper juxtaposes that decision with the more recent reasoning of Hon. Justice O.A. Adegbehingbe, JCA, in Emmanuel Odafe Igbini v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, to highlight the evolving judicial understanding that the right of appeal remains a fundamental constitutional safeguard that survives the effluxion of a custodial term. The discourse further explores impediments to the exercise of the right of appeal in Nigeria – ranging from procedural delays, indigence, and administrative inefficiencies to judicial misapprehension of precedent – and argues for a more context-sensitive application of stare decisis that aligns with the principles of fair hearing and substantive justice. Ultimately, the paper concludes that not all criminal appeals become academic upon the completion of a sentence, and that the courts must preserve the utilitarian and corrective functions of appellate review to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.